Carry / forwardApp Composer

Encrypt a fictional
assistant profile.

Carry a fictional profile and selected memories between assistants. Encrypt the file here; keep the passphrase with you.

Synthetic data only. This is a working demonstration, not permission to import real private records. All personas are invented; no Emilio data is used.

Meet Mira Vale.

An invented museum maker, with fictional memories and a few different perspectives. Identity, memory, uncertain questions and reviewed checkpoints stay distinct.

Never reuse a real password. The passphrase is not saved or sent anywhere. Losing it makes an encrypted export unrecoverable.

A locked workspace.

Open the synthetic fixture or import your encrypted demo file.

Fictional perspectives

Choose what a model receives.

The selected context is a separate disclosure. The master passphrase and full encrypted vault never belong in a provider prompt.

Inspect the complete outgoing context
Unlock a fictional fixture and select memories to see the exact disclosure.

Local encryption. Explicit disclosure.

AES-256-GCM, fresh salt and nonce per export, PBKDF2-SHA256 with 600,000 iterations, authenticated format version. The YAML-compatible JSON document is encrypted before it leaves this page. Wrong passphrases and modified ciphertext fail closed.

This tool makes no model or storage-server requests. Opt-in persistence stores ciphertext only. Clipboard content is deliberately plaintext after you approve it; your operating system and destination model then control that copy. Browser memory erasure cannot be guaranteed, and imported fictional text is context, never authority.

Device compromise, malicious extensions, passphrase recovery, full multi-device sync and independent security assurance remain open gates. Inspect the independent MIT source.